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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GRAND CORRUPTION  
IN TANZANIA 





Abstract. This article examines the political economy of grand corruption in Tanzania in the era 
of rapid growth and global integration. Grand corruption in Tanzania is linked to intra-elite 
conflicts within the ruling CCM party. However, the underlying dynamics of these struggles and 
how such elite politics interact with the wider process of socioeconomic transformation 
unfolding in Tanzania are not well understood. This article draws on a political settlements 
analytical framework to examine four major grand corruption scandals that occurred within 
public finance from 2000 until 2014. In particular, it sets out the key actors and patterns within 
the factional struggles over corruption in order to demonstrate how the elite within the ruling 
CCM party is not centralized but is rather composed of internal factions that have equal weight. 
The article explains how the enduring control of this elite, despite its internal divisions, can be 
explained by examining the balance of power in society beyond the institutions of the ruling 
party or the state itself.  The article then establishes the mechanisms through which grand 
corruption shapes paths of accumulation within the domestic economy in Tanzania. In 
concluding, it explains that the fragmented distribution of power within the ruling party means 
that policy responses of the donor community, in particular the halting of aid disbursements, 





CORRUPTION SCANDALS were a recurring feature of Tanzania’s political landscape at the 
start of the twenty-first century, against a backdrop of rapid economic growth and global 
integration. Grand corruption cases in public finances implicated senior politicians, high 
ranking government officials, domestic industrialists and multinational companies in a series 
of illegal activities involving bribes, kickbacks and the theft of public funds. In October 2014, 
the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) found itself embroiled in a corruption scandal 
that once again caused significant turbulence within the highest echelons of the state. This 
case involved the alleged illegal payment of US$122 million by senior state officials to 
businessmen under the guise of energy contracts. In response, twelve donors suspended aid 
payments to Tanzania pending a report into the affair by the controller auditor general and 
subsequently a number of senior figures within the ruling party who were implicated with the 
scandal resigned from their parliamentary duties1.  
  Such a response by donors and by the ruling party itself is by no means a new departure in 
Tanzania. While grand corruption occurred across a number of sectors including land, natural 
resources and industrial policy, it was the scandals in public finance that caused the greatest 
reverberations within the state and within the donor community. Since the mid 1980s, 
numerous accusations of grand corruption have been followed by the temporary suspension of 
                                                 
* Hazel Gray (h.s.gray@lse.ac.uk) is an LSE Fellow in the Department of International Development at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science. 
1 Mark Anderson ‘UK and international donors suspend Tanzania aid after corruption claims’ The Guardian On-
line, 13 October 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/oct/13/uk-and-international-
donors-suspend-tanzania-aid-after-corruption-claims> (14 October 2014), The Citizen ‘Three MPs resign over 
escrow billions bounty’, 22 January 2015, < http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/Three-MPs-resign-over-
escrow-billions-bounty/-/1840392/2598052/-/item/1/-/xc6v96/-/index.html> (8 February 2015). 
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aid and by concerted efforts by the ruling party to clamp down on high level corruption within 
its midst. These efforts involved short term political reshuffles as well as more far reaching 
institutional reforms to the state, but all with little effect, as the scandals recurred with 
depressing regularity.  
  The intractability of grand corruption in Tanzania contrasts with the gradual improvement in 
other aspects of public financial management since the turn of the century. At the end of the 
1990s, the Report on the Presidential Inquiry into Corruption in Tanzania identified 
widespread petty pilfering of funds channelled through the government system, illegal 
payments in public procurement and government awarded contracts for public works.2 As a 
number of major donors prepared to switch their aid modalities towards direct budget support, 
reducing these forms corruption became a major goal. Public financial management reforms 
were part of a broader anti-corruption drive that included two Parliamentary Acts, in 2002 and 
2007, on the prevention of corruption, as well as a strengthening of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corruption Bureau. Within public finances more specifically, the Public 
Financial Management Reform Programme aimed to reduce corruption through greater 
transparency and accountability. A cash budget, limiting payments to cash availability on a 
monthly basis, and a centralized payment system were introduced. The development of a 
medium-term expenditure framework and a Public Expenditure Review involving different 
stakeholders increased transparency. An expenditure tracking system was put in place to 
reduce leakages at service delivery level. By the mid-2000s, Tanzania had achieved some 
notable successes in constraining certain forms of bureaucratic corruption within the 
budgeting system.3 In the first Country Policy and Institutional Assessment in 2005, Tanzania 
scored considerably above the regional averages on all aspects relating to public finance. 
   The persistence of grand corruption in public finance despite these reforms points to 
the fact that the technical improvements in the budgeting process did little to address the 
underlying drivers of the phenomenon in Tanzania. Recently a number of scholars have 
linked grand corruption in Tanzania to the nature of elite politics within the ruling CCM 
party.4 For example, Michael Lofchie uses a rent-seeking framework that draws from Anne 
Kruger’s neoclassical economics approach to argue that grand corruption is a result of the 
centralization of power with members of a narrow elite that dominate the state and use 
corruption to consolidate their control over the economy. However, this approach does not 
adequately account for the internal fissures within the CCM elite that have also been exposed 
in these cases of grand corruption. In particular, we need to know much more about how order 
is maintained in the context of these factional conflicts. Another limitation with the literature 
on grand corruption in Tanzania is in the specification of the mechanisms through which 
grand corruption influences economic development. The standard rent-seeking framework 
rests on the assumption that grand corruption ultimately constrains economic development by 
raising the costs of collective goods and by undermining investor confidence. However, 
                                                 
2 United Republic of Tanzania, The report on the residential inquiry into corruption in Tanzania, Vol I and Vol 
II (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Government Printers, 1996). 
3 Reports of the Controller and Auditor General on the financial statements of public authorities and other bodies 
for the financial years 2005/06, 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09 (Dar es Salaam, National Audit Office, 2006-9). 
4 See for example Michael Lofchie The political economy of Tanzania: Decline and recovery (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2014); Tim Kelsall, Business politics and the state in Africa: Challenging the 
orthodoxies on growth and transformation (Zed Books, London, 2013); Ronald Aminzade, Race, nation and 
citizenship in post colonial Africa: The case of Tanzania (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014). 
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recent literature has shown that grand corruption is linked to a range of different economic 
outcomes.5 We need to know much more about the links between grand corruption and the 
processes of economic transformation unfolding in Tanzania.  
  In order to explain how intra-elite struggles exposed by grand corruption relate to the path of 
socioeconomic transformation in Tanzania, I draw on the political settlements theory 
developed by Mushtaq Khan.6 A political settlements approach places the phenomenon of 
corruption within the context of capitalist transformation in developing countries. A political 
settlement is the combination of institutions and the underlying distribution of power in a 
society. The distribution of power in society affects the ability of historically constituted 
social groups to acquire, or hold on to, property rights that generate income. In most 
developing countries, the distribution of political power between contending social groups is 
commonly not aligned with the formal structure of institutions. Instead, power often resides in 
clientelist networks that operate within and outside formal state institutions. Clientelism, as 
understood within the political settlements framework, results from specific features of late 
capitalist transformation relating to the challenge of consolidating power within formal 
institutions that are supported neither by a significant capitalist surplus nor by traditional 
sources of authority. The ways that power and institutions are combined within different 
political settlements have important implications for trajectories of economic development in 
low income countries. In particular, different institutional configurations and patterns of 
power within each political settlement will have implications for political stability and the 
ability of the state to implement policies to promote technological catch-up. Further, the 
characteristics of a political settlement affect the viability of different strategies of 
accumulation.7 A recent but burgeoning literature explores aspects of the political settlements 
theory and economic transformation in African countries.8  
  By extending this line of enquiry to grand corruption cases in Tanzania, this article makes a 
fresh contribution to the understanding of Tanzania’s political economy and furthers the 
broader debate about grand corruption, political settlements and economic development in 
Africa. Specifically, the article explains how the elite within the ruling CCM party is not 
centralized; rather, it is composed of internal factions that have equal weight. The article 
argues that this distribution of power within the elite means that it is difficult for the 
President, or any group within the ruling party to stop grand corruption. The article explains 
how the enduring control of this elite, despite its internal divisions, can be explained by 
                                                 
5 Jakob Svensson, ‘Eight questions about corruption’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 3 (2005), pp. 19 – 
24. 
6 Mushtaq Khan, ‘Class, clientelism and communal politics in contemporary Bangladesh’ in Kavalam Panikkar, 
Terrence Byres and Utsa Patnaik (eds), The making of history: Essays presented to Irfan Habib (Anthem Press, 
London, 1995), pp. 572-606.  
7 Mushtaq Khan, ‘Rent-seeking as process’ in Mushtaq Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (eds), Rents, rent-
seeking and economic development: Theory and evidence in Asia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2000), pp. 70-144. 
8 Mushtaq Khan and Hazel Gray ‘State Weakness in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional 
Reform – Operational Implications for Anti-Corruption Policy and A Case Study of Tanzania’. (Report for the 
Department for International Development, London, UK, September 2006), Hazel Gray and Mushtaq Khan, 
‘Good governance and growth in Africa: What can we learn from Tanzania?’ in Vishnu Padayachee (ed.), The 
political economy of Africa (Routledge, London, 2010); Lindsay Whitfield, Lars Buur, Ole Therkildsen, and 
Metter Kjær, The politics of African industrial policy: A comparative perspective (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2015); Tim Kelsall, Business politics and the state in Africa: Challenging the orthodoxies on growth 
and transformation (Zed Books, London, 2013). 
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examining who holds power in society beyond the formal institutions of the ruling party or 
the state itself.  The article clarifies the key factors in Tanzania’s history that shaped the 
contemporary distribution of power, namely the nature of the independence struggle and the 
experiences of attempting to construct socialism in the 1960s and 1970s. The article expands 
on the causal factors that explain how grand corruption shapes economic transformation. In 
doing so, it seeks to move beyond the idea advanced by Tim Kelsall and others that 
centralized and long horizon management of rents is necessary, to show how the specific and 
historically constructed relations between business and the state are critical in shaping the 
implications of grand corruption for accumulation within the domestic economy. In the case 
of post-socialist countries such as Tanzania, an important further factor is the extent to which 
economic institutions that facilitate collective action by politicians and business to channel 
resources into productive activities survived under economic liberalization.  
The article starts by setting out the links between public finance, corruption and the 
political settlement. It then presents a detailed analysis of four grand corruption cases that 
occurred in Tanzania over the period of high economic growth, tracing the pattern of 
struggles within the ruling party and the political and economic connections exposed in these 
cases. Based on this empirical evidence, the article explores the implications for the dynamics 
of elite struggles, changing state-business relations and how patterns of grand corruption 
interacted with processes of accumulation within the economy. The article concludes by 
explaining why withholding aid by donors is likely to continue to be unsuccessful as a 
strategy for tackling grand corruption and what a political settlements approach implies for 
attempts to control grand corruption in Tanzania.  Even under the threat of donor withdrawal 
of aid, the ability of the ruling CCM party to effectively constrain corruption is undermined 
by the fragmented distribution of power within the ruling party. However, beyond the intra-
elite struggles within CCM, other social forces are emerging in Tanzania. These social forces 
challenge the existing distribution of power and will affect the feasibility of different anti-
corruption agendas going forward. 
 
 
Public finances, corruption and the political settlement 
 
Public finance plays a critical function in economic performance through a multitude of 
different avenues, not least by funding the economic policies of the state, providing direct and 
indirect finance to businesses and by lowering the costs of production through investment in 
infrastructure and public services. Public finance also plays a vital political role in 
maintaining political stability in the face of competing demands for state resources from 
different social groups. Many of these transfers occur explicitly through the official 
government budget, where patterns of resource flows mainly reflect political pressures that 
are mediated by ‘negotiations’ through formal political institutions.9 However, other transfers 
of public finance that also play a critical function in economic performance and in generating 
political stability occur in the form of off-budget expenditures meaning outside official budget 
                                                 
9 With reference to Tanzania this is discussed in Laura Weinstein, ‘The politics of government expenditures in 
Tanzania 1999-2007’, African Studies Review 54, 1 (2011) pp. 33-57. 
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channels and away from the ‘glare of public scrutiny’.10 Of course, not all off-budget 
expenditure is associated with corruption. Off-budget flows can represent legitimate 
expenditure by the state where the details of expenditures are kept outside of the official 
budget documents. These flows could be thought of as the ‘known-unknowns’ of public 
finance. In Tanzania these flows included funds to the State House and to the army,11 as well 
as other expenditure that was undertaken by public agencies and parastatal firms. While not 
officially part of the public expenditures of the state, the high degree of political influence 
over these institutions meant that such expenditure can, in effect, be considered a form of 
state expenditure. Over the past decade, Tanzania was widely seen as a success story in terms 
of efforts to crack down on these forms of off-budget finance.  
  The other form of off-budget expenditures were the covert and illegal payments that were 
officially ignored or denied. These payments included forms of petty corruption that resulted 
from the inability of the state to constrain theft by some public employees in Ministries and 
local government as well as the grand corruption that occurred at higher levels of office 
within the state. While the technical and formal procedural changes that occurred within 
public financial management across the 2000s were relatively effective at reducing petty 
corruption, they did little to reduce the grand corruption that only came to light subsequently 
through the high profile cases discussed below.  
  These inscrutable forms of off-budget expenditure by the state appeared to be shaped by 
complex links between individuals in the ruling party and individuals within the private 
sector. Different forms of grand corruption, and the opposition they generate within the ruling 
party and more widely in society, reflect the distribution of power in a country. Hence, a 
picture of the distribution of power can be gleaned by studying the outcome of contests over 
resource flows in their particular historical context. Underneath Tanzania’s formal negotiated 
settlement, reflected in the institutional structures of the state and the ruling party, is a 
continuous process of struggle among groups over resource flows and property rights. It is in 
the details of these struggles that the implications of grand corruption for Tanzania’s 
development path and the possibilities for constraining corruption can be found. 
 
The grand corruption cases 
 
The four grand corruption cases discussed here all occurred within the realm of public 
finances over the period of higher economic growth from the end of the 1990s until 2014 and 
under the Presidencies of both Benjamin Mkapa and Jakaya Kikwete. Grand corruption in 
Tanzania, as elsewhere, occurs behind a veil of secrecy that is rarely punctured. My account 
of these corruption cases draws on numerous sources, including parliamentary debates and 
official government documents, interviews, non-governments organizations (NGOs) and 
donor analysis, US embassy cables released by wiki leaks, media reports and court cases 
relating to corruption. Nevertheless, the facts behind grand corruption remain contested by the 
parties involved. A further caveat with regard to data quality relates to the fact that all these 
sources are subject to political bias, particularly in Tanzania where there is considerable 
                                                 
10 Andrew MacIntyre, ‘Funny money: Fiscal policy, rent seeking and economic performance in Indonesia’ in 
Mushtaq Khan and Kwame Sundaram Jomo (eds), Rents, rent seeking and economic development: Theory and 
evidence in Asia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 248-273. 
11 Transparency International UK, ‘The transparency of national defence budgets’ (Transparency International 
UK, Defence and Security Programme, London, 2011).  
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political shadow-play behind the legal wrangling and media accounts of corruption. The 
timing and manner of the exposure of these corruption cases can partly be explained by a 
number of specific developments within Tanzania’s political economy over the decade. These 
include the rise of a more plural and vocal media, which has been increasingly active in 
exposing and discussing corruption.12 Parliament also became a more open forum for 
criticism of the ruling party, both from within the party’s own ranks and from the emergent 
opposition, notably through Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo’s (CHADEMA) 
CHADEMA[NC1]’s increasing presence. These changes may not have reduced the occurrence 
of grand corruption but they did shape the extent and way in which details of corruption have 
come into the open across the period.  
  While other smaller corruption scandals came to light over the same period as the four cases 
discussed here, the importance of these cases is that they give an unprecedented insight into 
the otherwise opaque inner political struggles at the top of the ruling party. The first case 
involved a deal with the British firm British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) for the purchase 
of a civil aviation radar. The deal led to an international scandal in 1999, when investigators 
from the British Serious Fraud Office identified the deal as significantly corrupt and BAE was 
forced to pay 30 million pounds in fines. On the Tanzanian side, the deal was brokered by a 
business man Sailesh Vithlani and the investigators found that part of the considerable kick-
backs paid to him by BAE were used to bribe senior government officials working in 
Mkapa’s government.13 The main political support for the deal came from a number of figures 
whose names were frequently associated with contemporary corruption scandals, including 
the Attorney General at the time, Andrew Chenge, as well as an ex-Governor of the Bank of 
Tanzania, Dr Idris Rashidi.14 While Mr Vithlani was pursued by local courts over this case, 
the Tanzanian Prevention of Corruption Bureau was hindered from pursuing cases against 
other senior political figures implicated in the affair.15  
  Grand corruption in public procurement also emerged within the energy sector where the 
Richmond scandal and the Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL) scandal illustrate 
similar patterns of contention within the ruling party and links between senior party figures 
and domestic and international business. The details of the two cases are as follows. In June 
2005, Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited ( TANESCO) advertised [NC2]a tender for 
emergency power supply, but in February 2006 all the proposals, including one from a firm 
called Richmond Development Company LLC (Richmond), that had previously been 
involved in a failed attempt to construct an oil pipe line from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza, were 
rejected as none of them showed sufficient competence and financial surety.16 The main 
                                                 
12 Miki Tanessi, ‘Media power and political power in the war against corruption in Tanzania’, Journal of the 
Advancement of Journalism 3, (2010) pp. 4-10. 
13 Tim Jarrett and Claire Taylor, ‘Bribery allegations and BAE systems’, Standard Note: SN/BT/5367 (House of 
Commons Library, Business and Transport Section and International Affairs and Defence Section). 
14 British High Commission ‘Summary of Kiswahili Press 1 April 2009’, (British High Commission, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania 1 April 2009). WHAT IS THIS A REFERENCE TO? IT IS NOT CLEAR – IS IT A 
REPORT? IF SO WE NEED AN AUTHOR AND WE NEED THE REPORT TITLE TO BE HIGHLIGHTED 
EITHER IN QUOTE MARKS OR IN ITALICS. 
15 Embassy of the United States ‘Big Fish Still Risky Catch in Tanzania’ (US Embassy Cables, Tuesday, 24 July 
2007) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/116436 19> (19 December 2010). THIS 
IS NOT FORMATTED CORRECTLY SEE PREVIOUS ISSUES OF JOURNAL 
16 Republic of Tanzania, ‘Report of the special committee of the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania 
of 13 November 2007 to investigate the criteria used to award the contract for the production of emergency 
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political support for Richmond came from Mr Msahaba, the Minister for Energy and his 
successor Mr Nazir Karamagi as well as from the Prime Minister Edward Lowassa.17  
  Despite TANESCO’s rejection, Mr Msahaba moved all tendering to his Ministry and Prime 
Minister Edward Lowassa instructed that officials in the Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
should disqualify other bidders and award the tender to Richmond.18 Problems started shortly 
afterwards, however, as Richmond failed to achieve financial backing and it was only with 
funds provided by the government that it was able to bring in the generator to convert gas 
from Songo Songo into electricity as it had agreed to do.19 Later that year, the Prime Minister, 
Edward Lowassa, intervened to ensure that Richmond’s contract was extended, despite 
contrary advice from TANESCO.20 The on-going electricity crisis and Richmond’s failure to 
deliver electricity brought the company under scrutiny in Parliament and in the national 
media. By the end of 2006, Richmond was facing extreme difficulties in fulfilling its 
commitment to produce electricity and evidence emerged that the company had been 
completely unsuitable, both in terms of size and experience, as a provider of electricity.  
  Concerns over irregularities in the tendering process led to an investigation by the 
Prevention of Corruption Bureau, which announced that it had found no evidence of 
corruption. Nevertheless, within a few months a Parliamentary Commission was established 
to investigate the Richmond saga.21 It concluded that there had been corruption in awarding 
the contract to Richmond. As a result, the Prime Minister Edward Lowassa tendered his 
resignation as did Mr Msahaba and Mr Nazir Karamagi. The full political fall-out from the 
case was limited as the government issued a response to the report which exonerated all 
politicians and senior civil servants from wrong-doing. By 2011, the only person to have been 
taken to court was one of the alleged owners of Richmond and he was acquitted by a local 
court.22  
  The other grand corruption scandal involving private energy procurement has its roots in a 
large power supply contract signed in 1995 between the IPTL and the government. Despite 
serious accusations of corruption surrounding the tendering process, an agreement was signed 
that tied Tanzania into an expensive deal that was not in the economic interests of the 
country.23 Interestingly, there was evidence of opposition to the deal from within the state. A 
                                                                                                                                                        
electricity to Richmond Development Company LLC of Houston, Texas, USA in 2006’ (Parliament of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, Dodoma, 2008).   
17 Katharine Gratwick, Rebecca Ghanadan, and Anton Eberhard, ‘Generating Power and Controversy: 
Understanding Tanzania’s Independent Power Projects’ Journal of Energy in Southern Africa 17, 4, (November 2006) pp 
39 - 56Gratwick et al, Generating power and controversy. THIS IS THE ONLY PLACE THIS TEXT IS CITED, 
SO WE NEED THE FULL CITATION HERE. 
18 Angel Navuri ‘Cabinet Dissolved’ The Guardian, Tanzania, 8 February 2008, 
<http://www.ippmedia.com/ipp/guardian/2008/02/08/107959.html 8/2/08> (8 February 2008). 
19 Ibid.  
20 Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania Report of the special committee of the Parliament of the United 
Republic of Tanzania of 13 November 2007 Taarifa ya Kamati. IF THIS RELATES TO FOOTNOTE 17, 
PLEASE CHANGE THIS IN LINE WITH THE NEW TEXT THERE. 
21 Ibid Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania Taarifa ya Kamati. IF THIS RELATES TO FOOTNOTE 
17, PLEASE CHANGE THIS IN LINE WITH THE NEW TEXT THERE. 
22 The Citizen, ‘Why Richmond Lone Suspect is a Free Man’, 28 July 2011, 
<http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/51-other-news/13248-why-richmond-lone-suspect-is-a-free-man.html> (28 
July 2011). 
23 Brian Cooksey, ‘The Power and the vainglory: Anatomy of a Malaysian IPP in Tanzania’ in Jomo Kwame 
Sundaram Ugly Malaysians? South-South Investment Abused (Centre for Black Research, K.S. Durban, 2002) pp 47 - 
76Cooksey, The Power and the vainglory. THIS IS THE ONLY PLACE THIS TEXT IS CITED, SO WE NEED 
THE FULL CITATION HERE. 
8 
 
number of senior officials within the Ministry of Energy and Minerals opposed the deal but 
other senior politicians supported IPTL. Brian Cooksey reported that at one point the 
Tanzanian Prevention of Corruption Bureau was close to pressing corruption charges over the 
case, but these never materialized.24 The case was finally referred to the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1998 and TANESCO requested the ICSID 
to consider corruption charges in 2000. A number of key officials from the Ministry of 
Energy and Minerals provided sworn statements. Finally, however, the charges of corruption 
were dropped, as the government failed to come forward with further substantiating evidence 
on corruption in the timeframe imposed by the ICSID, suggesting that there were 
disagreements within the state about pursuing the charges.25 Controversy surrounding IPTL 
erupted again in 2014 when the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was asked to investigate 
alleged fraudulent payments from an escrow account set up by TANESCO to the energy firm 
and to a number of senior CCM politicians.26 To date, an MP and the Attorney General have 
resigned from their positions, three further MPs have resigned from their parliamentary duties 
while the Prime Minister, also identified by the PAC as being involved in the scandal, has 
resisted pressure from Parliament to step down.27 At the same time, key figures involved in 
IPTL have hit back claiming that the PAC has used the case to settle political scores.28  
  While the Richmond and IPTL case involved just a handful of business people, another 
major corruption scandal in 2007, involving illegal payments from the External Payments 
Arrears account under the Bank of Tanzania, exposed a much wider set of links between the 
ruling party and businesses in the country. At the heart of the scandal was the Banks’ 
commercial external debt account, set up to help service the balance of payments. Local 
importers could pay into the account in Tanzanian shillings and foreign companies could then 
be paid by the Bank of Tanzania in foreign currency. After its establishment, special measures 
had been introduced that allowed foreign creditors to assign payments to local companies.29 
Rumours of corruption started circulating on the internet and, following pressure from 
development partners, the government asked Ernst and Young to undertake an audit into 
‘dubious payments’ to local firms that had been made from the account.30  
  The firm identified US$ 131 million that had been improperly paid to 22 local firms. Five 
major banks were identified as having colluded in laundering the money. Dr Daudi Balali, the 
Governor of the Bank of Tanzania, who had previously worked for the IMF as well as 
advising the President of Tanzania, was directly implicated in authorising the payments and 
                                                 
24 Ibid.  
25 Zitto Kabwe, ‘How Pan Africa Power Ltd acquired Independent Power Tanzania Ltd for almost nothing and 
loted US$ 124 m from the Bank of Tanzania’ (Briefing Paper, Chair, Public Accounts Committee, 2014),  
<http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/fileadmin/documents/dpg_internal/dpg_working_groups_clusters/cluster_3/governance
_working_group/gwg_meetings/September_2014/IPTL_Brief_FINAL_edit.pdf > (3 January 2015). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Mussa Juma ‘How Pinda survived escrow scandal storm in Parliament’ The Citizen, 1 December 2014 
<http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/-/1840392/2540870/-/ahjv3/-/index.html> (15 January 2015). 
28 Christopher Kidanka ‘Tanzania’s PAC used escrow account scandal to settle scores – Rugemalira’, The East 
African, 3 January 2015, < http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Tanzania-PAC-used-escrow-account-scandal-
to-settle-scores/-/2558/2577444/-/s08ixj/-/index.html> (30 January 2015). 
29 United Republic of Tanzania, ‘National Audit Office Report of the Controller and Auditor General on the 
special audit performed by Ernst and Young in respect of the External Payment Arrears (EPA) Account during 
the financial year 2005/2006’ (The United Republic of Tanzania National Audit Office, Dar es Salaam, January 
2009). 
30 Ibid.  
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was forced to resign.31 A number of the firms that received the money belonged to prominent 
business people with strong links to CCM and to senior members of CCM. The President 
issued an ultimatum that the stolen funds had to be repaid, and in 2008 it was announced to 
the media that most had been repaid, although who actually repaid money and how much 
remained a secret32. Some business people were later sent to prison. However the government 
was accused of protecting the business people who had links to the CCM33, particularly in 
relation to the firm that was a major recipient of corrupt External Payments Arrears payments, 
Kagoda Agriculture Limited,34 which was allegedly associated with a very senior CCM 
politician.35  
  During the court cases it was reported that a significant proportion of the funds that had been 
acquired through the External Payments Arrears payments had been taken out of the country 
and kept in foreign bank accounts,36 fuelling concern about the detrimental links between 
grand corruption and capital flight. Despite vacillation within the highest ranks of the party, in 
the end it pulled together to stop any further political implications for senior figures. 
Nevertheless, the case had significant reverberations within the factional politics of CCM. In 
April 2011, Rostam Aziz and Andrew Chenge were removed from the National Executive 
Committee but this group continued to have considerable support within the party at the 
national and local level. At the top of the party an internal fissure emerged between the so 
called CCM-Safi politicians, who had sought to expose these cases, and the so-called CCM-
Mafisadi who had been associated with the EPA and Richmond scandal.  
  These cases had common features in terms of the actors involved and the dynamics of 
internal party politics. In each case there is evidence of struggles within the party over 
whether the questionable deals should go ahead and whether those implicated should be held 
to account. At the same time, despite the internal fissures exposed by these cases, none of the 
senior CCM politicians who were removed from their posts sought to create greater divisions 
by breaking from the CCM. In all of these cases the media accounts tended to focus on the 
Tanzanian-Asian business partners and a handful of senior politicians while the role of 
Tanzanian-African business men, international businesses and multinational companies 
received less attention. Prima facia, grand corruption in these cases led to inflated prices for 
procurement and financial loss for the Government of Tanzania. The relationship between 
these cases and the wider processes of economic transformation unfolding in Tanzania is, 
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however, much more complex than a simple trade off between corruption and economic 
growth.   
 
 
The dynamics of intra-elite struggles within CCM 
 
The prevalence of grand corruption within public finance involving large infrastructural 
projects, foreign capital and huge kickbacks to senior politicians follows a common identified 
in many developing countries.37 Yet the types of investment projects that Tanzania ended up 
accepting appeared to be particularly poor, compared for example to Vietnam38 or Malaysia,39 
where similar patterns of corruption associated with infrastructural investments have been 
documented. Interestingly, in Tanzania’s case there is ample evidence that senior figures 
within the party and Government did attempt to prevent these corrupt procurement deals 
going through. The fact that these attempts failed was a result of the particular dynamics of 
factional politics within the ruling party. The factional nature of Tanzanian politics has been 
mainly discussed in terms of the ideological divisions within the CCM in the 1980s and 1990s 
over whether to pursue liberalization.40 However, the type of factional politics that is 
exhibited in these cases has little to do with the earlier ideological divides. Nor do the factions 
within CCM map onto regional, ethnic or clan based cleavages. Instead, the networks within 
CCM are based on ties that were forged in schools and universities and were then 
consolidated through political careers within the institutions of the state and ruling party.41 At 
the same time, the distribution of power between factions within the ruling party involved in 
these cases appears to be relatively equal in so far as no one faction was able to consistently 
dominate within the National Executive Committee of the CCM over the period.42  
  Aspects of Tanzania’s political settlement can explain these political features. Internally, the 
CCM is dominated by a narrow elite and, while there is churning amongst this group, the 
senior figures directly implicated in these scandals under both Presidencies quickly returned 
to positions of influence within the party. Despite tensions, the narrow elite at the top of CCM 
collaborated to maintain its hold on power and avoid a damaging split in the party itself. On 
one level, the institutional centralization of the party constructed during the socialist period 
was clearly a factor in maintaining party cohesion and constrained internal factions from 
organising outside the party institutions43. At independence, the ruling party was poorly 
institutionalized with few resources at its disposal. It sought to overcome these institutional 
limitations by establishing a bureaucratized party structure down to the village level, 
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consolidating control of the existing state bureaucracy under the party44 and effectively 
integrating party institutions within the civil service.45 These institutional features continued 
to exert a centripetal force on Tanzanian politics. Nevertheless, a focus on the degree of 
centralization of the institutions of the ruling party alone may be misleading, as the 
appearance of a relatively centralized political system was primarily the result of the wider 
distribution of power in which Tanzania’s formal political institutions are situated.      
  The distribution of power in society relates to organizational capabilities that are not only 
held by those with institutional positions within political parties or by those with economic 
power. The capacity to mobilize people to achieve political ends also comes from past 
experience of political struggle. In particular, the nature of the independence struggle and 
processes of state formation in the years immediately after independence are critical to 
understanding the balance of power in post-colonial states. In Tanzania, as in many other 
developing countries, it was the members of intermediate classes,46 made up of clerks and 
junior civil servants within the colonial administration and teachers who were the key 
organizers of the independence struggle. They played the pivotal role in establishing the 
Tanganyika African Association (TAA) that later became the Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU) and lead the independence struggle. Yet the size of the intermediate class in 
Tanzania was small as a result of the limited size of the colonial state in Tanzania and the 
relatively egalitarian rural socioeconomic structures that endured across the colonial period.47 
The type of struggles that occurred during the independence movement involved organized 
protests, non-co-operation with Government policies and strikes by trade unions. However, 
the struggle was essentially non-violent and primarily followed constitutional means to 
demand the hand-over of power. The relatively short and largely constitutional struggle that 
led up to Tanzanian independence in 1961 left the country with a muted experience of 
political mobilization. After independence the leaders of the independence struggle were 
absorbed within the institutions of the ruling party.  
Therefore, the socialist period started with a limited distribution of power outside 
formal political institutions. The efforts to create a socialist system in the 1960s and 1970s 
further consolidated political power within the formal institutions of the ruling party by 
suppressing the emergence of other potentially powerful groups outside of the party structure, 
in particular by limiting the power of Native Authority structures,48 and by controlling urban 
labour and the cooperative movement.49 Hence, the distribution of political power in Tanzania 
maps onto the formal political institutions of the ruling party to a much greater extent than in 
other countries where power is organized along ethnic, regional or class-based cleavages 
within and outside formal political institutions. One consequence of these features of 
Tanzania’s political settlement was that even after the move to multiparty elections in 1995, 
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the scope for political mobilization outside the ruling party structure was limited. The ruling 
party in Tanzania, therefore, did not have to deal with widespread political activism, whether 
organized along class lines or by multi-class networks led by intermediate class groups 
outside of the party structures. The lack of external opposition meant that a degree of 
centralized authority within the party could be maintained at relatively low cost.  
These features of Tanzania’s evolving political settlement provided a stable overall 
political architecture and the appearance of centralized authority. However, the consolidation 
of power within the formal political institutions of the ruling party did not mean that there was 
an effective hierarchical or centralized authority structure within the party. In Tanzania, 
regardless of the formal constitutional rules, power is not centralized around the President. In 
contrast to the findings of pervasive presidentialism in many African countries50, the 
Tanzanian case suggests that behind the formal constitutional rules, power is considerably 
fragmented even at the top of a dominant party system. Despite the appearance of centralized 
authority, neither the president nor any one particular faction could enforce its particular 
agenda within the ruling party. Factions within the CCM that emerged to contest or protect 
flows of resources from grand corruption were weak vis-a-vis each other. The limited 
distribution of political power outside the party meant that senior political figures within 
CCM could not tap into politically mobilized groups outside of the ruling party framework in 
battles for influence within the CCM.  
  As a result, the apparent strength of the CCM relates more to the limited distribution of 
political power outside the party, than to the CCM itself having a very strong centralized 
power structure. The weak but stable political settlement in Tanzania of the 2000s allowed a 
number of very poor deals to be made that were opposed by some senior figures within the 
ruling party. The extent of controls on grand corruption that was feasible under Tanzania’s 
political settlement in the 2000s contrasts with the more effective disciplining of rent-seeking 
processes that occurred in successful East Asian developers. Under these political settlements, 
during the early periods of rapid economic transition in the 1970s and 1980s, leaders at times 
allowed high level corruption to occur to ensure political stability, but also had the power to 
ensure that the outcomes of corrupt procurement deals were broadly in line with wider 
economic development objectives.51 
  Economic transformation is an on-going process in Tanzania. With an increasing pace of 
accumulation and growing inequality and socioeconomic differentiation under liberalization, 
the stable political dynamics that sustained CCM are likely to change. In particular, the ability 
of certain factions within CCM to tap into financial resources and influence local candidate 
selection within CCM, as was witnessed in 2013,52 may tip the balance of power within the 
party towards one particular faction. The implications of this for CCM cohesion, as well as 
for the pace and nature of socioeconomic change, will not primarily be determined by the 
personal character traits of the political actors involved in these factional struggles. Rather, it 
                                                 
50 Nicolas van de Walle, ‘Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa’s emerging party systems’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies 41, 2 (2003) pp. 297-321. 
51 Ha Joon Chang ‘The political economy of industrial policy in Korea’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 17, 
1993, pp. 131-157. 
52 Oxford Analytica Daily Brief. Oxford Analytica Daily Brief ‘Tanzania: Kikwete Struggles with CCM 
Factionalism’ December 2, 2009 (Oxford Analytica, Oxford, UK)  WHAT DOES THIS REFER TO? IT 




will depend on the interaction of elite politics with patterns of accumulation in the economy 
and wider dynamics of political change that occur outside the institutions of the ruling party.  
 
 
State-business relations and grand corruption 
 
The relationship between the foreign and the local private sector and the state has changed in 
significant ways since the shift towards economic liberalization from the mid-1980s and the 
gradual lifting of restrictions on private accumulation and foreign investment.  Much of the 
analysis of the relationship between the state and business has focused on changes to the 
formal institutional position of the private sector in Tanzania’s political and economic system. 
These changes included the introduction of the Tanzania Business Council, increasing number 
of CCM politicians with a background in business,53 and the extensive processes of 
privatization across the economy that saw a return of assets to many of the pre-Ujamaa 
owners.54 Yet the corruption cases discussed above suggest that there were also extensive 
informal relations between the top leadership within the ruling party and prominent members 
of Tanzania’s small domestic private sector.55 The media accounts of these corruption cases 
focused in particular on Tanzanian-Asian business owners who have held a prominent 
position within Tanzania’s private sector since independence. The importance of this group 
within the private sector grew out of the racially structured economy that was constructed 
across East Africa initially under colonialism and then in the immediate post-independence 
years prior to the Arusha Declaration.56   
  The informal relations between business and the ruling party are perhaps as important as the 
changing formal position of domestic business for explaining Tanzania’s economic 
experience over the decade. However, I argue that the informal associations between large 
and medium sized business owners and party officials that are exposed in these cases of grand 
corruption emerged from much deeper historical roots than is recognized in accounts that 
focus primarily on Tanzania’s political economy after liberalization.57 These relations were 
illustrated in the corruption scandal involving the Bank of Tanzania External Payments 
Arrears account, where a number of the businesses involved appeared either to have had 
direct links to politicians or were owned by people with ties to the ruling party that developed 
during the Ujamaa era.  
    In the Ujamaa period, the ruling party attempted to forge a more egalitarian economy by 
restricting the formal economic and political power of international business and the 
predominantly Tanzanian-Asian domestic business community through nationalisation and by 
placing limits on private trade. Yet in a longer term perspective, the limits on the private 
sector were relatively short-lived and economic policy often simply overlooked the existence 
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of the private sector.58 Severe constraints on the material and technical resources under the 
control of the state also limited its ability to bring about a thorough transformation of 
economic power under Ujamaa. Thus, the attempts to create socialism in the 1960s and 1970s 
had much less impact on the distribution of economic power in Tanzania compared to its 
impact on shaping the distribution of political power as set out above. The result was that a 
proportion of economic activities, particularly in the industrial sector, remained in private 
hands throughout the period,59 and while they operated under risky conditions, Tanzanian-
Asian businesses continued to play a role in the economy throughout this period. 
  Similar developments occurred in the political sphere: while the political discourse of the 
period increasingly portrayed the Tanzanian-Asian business class as enemies of Ujamaa,60 
there were a hand-full of prominent figures from the Tanzanian Asian community who held 
positions of formal power within the ruling party.61 Their access to formal political power, 
albeit limited, contrasts with the lack of access to formal political positions for Kenyan-
Asians who were faced with a much stronger emerging Kenyan-African business class over 
the same period.62 Even under Ujamaa, beyond the formal institutional positions, informal 
relations also existed between those holding political power within the state and those with 
access to economic resources and trade networks. This was manifested in illegal 
racketeering63 and a number of political scandals that came to light in the early 1980s.64  
  Thus, an important and enduring aspect of Tanzania’s political settlement that came to the 
fore during the grand corruption cases in the 2000s was the entrenched informal relations 
between Asian Tanzanian businesses and the ruling party. However these relationships had 
their roots in economic developments not only of the early 1960s but across the whole period 
since independence including during the Ujamaa period. The small size of the domestic 
economy meant that there were few alternative sources of financing for the ruling party. The 
same business groups remained important for the ruling party under both Presidents. The 
continued backing of important business figures for the CCM throughout liberalization 
reflected the continued capacity of the ruling party to absorb potentially powerful groups and 
limit the opportunities for political mobilization outside its own institutional framework.  
  Yet the ability of the ruling party to absorb important business figures did not override the 
political difficulties involved in channelling resources to a group that held limited political 
legitimacy with the broader public. This played out, amongst other things, in the tardy 
provision of targeted infrastructure for industrial development, despite official commitments, 
across most of the decade.65 Ironically, the EPA scandal demonstrated that informal transfers 
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to the domestic private sector were perhaps easier to organize than the formal mechanisms for 
financing industrialization. Effective formal mechanisms for subsidizing industrialization 
would have required a more co-ordinated effort to transfer resources to domestic capitalists, 
but given the limited political legitimacy of this group within the political settlement, such 
open transfers were not politically feasible during the period in question.  
 
 
Grand corruption and accumulation  
 
Corruption is normally assumed to have negative economic implications and to lead to lower 
levels of investment.66 However, building on the Marxist concept of primitive accumulation, 
resources generated by grand corruption can potentially feed back into forms of investment 
and hence influence the overall pace and character of economic transformation.67 The 
implications for economic development of grand corruption will, therefore, be shaped by the 
types of investment that are associated with resources generated by the illegal appropriation 
of assets. In Tanzania, the impression in the media and in parliamentary discussions was that 
rather than funding local investment in productive activities, corrupt forms of accumulation 
associated with these scandals mainly resulted in capital flight. The extent to which grand 
corruption leads to local investment as opposed to capital flight is partly a result of 
international systemic factors, such as financialization within the global economy.68  
  However, the relative power of different groups to protect their investments also influences 
the incentive structure for local investment. This means that national level political 
settlements also affect the degree of capital flight that is associated with grand corruption. 
Evidence from Tanzania on the specific link between grand corruption in public finance and 
capital flight is patchy and equivocal. Anecdotal evidence of capital flight emerged from the 
court cases discussed above and in parliamentary discussions on the impact of corruption in 
Tanzania.69 However, James Boyce and Leonce Ndikumana’s detailed analysis of capital 
flight on the continent place Tanzania’s capital flight at a lower level than other African 
countries with similar sized economies.70 Such evidence gives credence to the argument that 
incomes generated by grand corruption did not simply flow out of the country, but that a 
proportion of these resources was also used to invest in the local economy.  Indeed, a growing 
proportion of investment was financed from domestic savings across the 2000s.71 Further, the 
close informal relations between members of the domestic business sector and officials within 
the ruling party described above may have facilitated the channelling of some off-budget 
transfers to local investment, particularly in the urban construction boom.    
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   Nevertheless, Tanzania’s political settlement in the 2000s led to a very different experience 
from some other high-growth late developers such as Vietnam. In Vietnam, as in Tanzania, 
the party institutions created during the socialist period have endured and provide a strong 
institutional framework that gives an appearance of centralized authority. Nevertheless, while 
power maps onto the institutions of the ruling party, the central leadership is often unable to 
clamp down on corruption within the ruling party and, as in Tanzania, the ruling party does 
not exhibit the capacity for centralized control of corruption. However, in the case of 
Vietnam, the dense institutional and political legacy of the socialist state at the local level 
provided multiple links between financial and party institutions that facilitated the channelling 
of resources generated through corruption into productive investments, albeit often with low 
levels of transparency and efficiency.72  
  Tanzania’s socialist period left a much stronger institutional framework of the state 
compared to many other African countries. In comparison to Vietnam, however, the political 
and economic institutions that survived under liberalization in Tanzania were much less 
dense, making collective action by state officials and business to channel resources into 
productive activities more difficult. In Tanzania, there was neither the centralized authority 
within the ruling party to influence grand corruption nor an institutional framework for 
economic activities within the state that could have been used to channel resources generated 
through corruption into more productive investments. Thus, the type of primitive 
accumulation associated with corruption in public finance in Tanzania mainly led to unequal 
processes of individual enrichment rather than supporting the broader economic 





The objective of this article was to examine the drivers and consequences of grand corruption 
in public finance in Tanzania over the period of rapid economic growth from the end of the 
1990s. I draw on a political settlements analytical framework to bring out a number of facets 
of four grand corruption scandals that challenge existing interpretations of Tanzania’s 
political economy. Grand corruption has been resistant to anti-corruption reforms across 
Africa but the reasons for this intractability are actually quite unique to different countries, 
depending on how power is distributed within and outside formal institutions. In Tanzania, 
grand corruption is difficult to constrain because different factions within the ruling party 
hold equal weight and neither the president nor any particular faction is able to dominate 
within these elite struggles. The article argues that the on-going cohesion of the ruling party in 
the face of elite struggles exhibited in these corruption cases was not simply the result of the 
institution building of the party that occurred during the Ujamaa period. Cohesion was also 
the result of particular features of Tanzania’s distribution of power, in particular, the relatively 
constrained experience of political mobilization and limited socioeconomic differentiation 
that characterized Tanzania for most of the twentieth century. These political dynamics 
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remained remarkably consistent under both presidents and are likely to continue to shape the 
nature of elite struggles within the ruling party even after the elections this year. 
  The cases of grand corruption examined also provide insights into the changing relationship 
between capital and the state over the decade. The domestic private sector and the ruling party 
have had much closer relations than is recognized in many accounts of Tanzania’s political 
economy that focus on the institutionalized relationships between the private sector and the 
state. Informal relations that pre-dated the liberalization era became solidified through various 
formal institutional fora across the 1990s and 2000s. However, public animosity towards the 
predominantly Tanzanian-Asian business community endured over the period. This made it 
difficult for the ruling party to target larger transfers of finance to the development of 
domestic businesses through formal public financing mechanisms. Off-budget transfers in the 
form of grand corruption may have supported some forms of economic investments, but these 
flows were too fragmented and inadequate to overcome the high costs associated with 
bringing about a more rapid pace of structural change in the economy.  
  A key insight that emerges from the political settlements analysis presented here is that the 
policy responses of the donor community to grand corruption in Tanzania, in particular the 
halting of aid disbursements, are likely to continue to be ineffective in stopping grand 
corruption. This is because such policies are based on the assumption that grand corruption 
can be stopped once rationally maximizing leaders have more to gain by clamping down on 
corruption than by letting it continue. In reality, the ability of the ruling party to effectively 
constrain corruption is shaped by the nature of elite struggles and their interaction with the 
wider distribution of power in society. Nevertheless, a political settlements approach does not 
support the crude idea that the possibility of reducing grand corruption in Tanzania simply 
depends on achieving economic development. This is because political movements as well as 
economic structures shape distributions of power in society, which in turn influence the 
feasibility of different anti-corruption agendas. This analysis of the drivers of corruption 
implies an approach to political and economic reform that falls far outside the remit of donor-
led anti-corruption initiatives.  
  Beyond the intra-elite struggles within the CCM examined in this article, other social forces 
are emerging in Tanzania that challenge the existing distribution of power and the formal 
institutional framework of the state. These are manifested in the increasing number of protests 
over land rights, religious grievances payments for public sector workers and student loans.74 
The mobilization of new social forces will interact with existing structures of elite politics, 
leading to changes in the balance of power within the CCM and upsetting the equilibrium 
within the existing factional networks. However, such new political forces could also overturn 
the existing order by providing a focus for consolidation outside the existing institutional 
framework. In either case, a significant redistribution of power would result that might 
constrain grand corruption, at least in the short term. Yet popular political movements against 
grand corruption are embedded within a range of different political and economic agendas. 
The anti corruption agenda promoted by donors in Tanzania over the past twenty years has 
gone hand in hand with efforts to promote economic liberalization. Whether these political 
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movements will also be aligned to the liberal economic agenda of the existing political parties 
and donors is far from certain.   
